Institutional quality and economic performance in the Caribbean and Latin America by VEGA CENTENO GAMARRA, Jose Emilio
  
 
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN 
THE CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA 
 
 
 
By 
VEGA CENTENO GAMARRA, Jose Emilio 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted to 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of 
MASTER OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
 
 
 
2016 
  
 
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN 
THE CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA 
 
 
 
By 
VEGA CENTENO GAMARRA, Jose Emilio 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted to 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of 
MASTER OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
 
 
 
2016 
Professor Shun WANG 
  
 
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE 
CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA 
 
 
 
By 
VEGA CENTENO GAMARRA, Jose Emilio 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted to 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of 
MASTER OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Committee in 
charge: 
 
 
Professor Shun WANG, Supervisor    
 
 
Professor Baran HAN 
 
 
Professor Jong-Il YOU 
 
 
Approval as of December, 
2016
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Institutional Quality and Economic Performance in the Caribbean and Latin America 
 
By 
 
Jose Emilio Vega Centeno Gamarra 
 
This study employed panel data analysis for the period between 1996 and 2010, to ascertain the 
overarching institutional constituent in explaining output per capita differences across the 
Caribbean and Latin America. It was inferred from the regression results that of all the 
investigated institutional components, the control of corruption index was not only the most 
robust in all the specified empirical models, but it was invariably positive and statistically 
significant. More so, a combination of corruption control plus the voice and accountability 
indices, elicited a robust and statistically significant correlation between it and real GDP Per 
Capita. Akin to Gaskins and Kock (2013), the latter results manifest the role voice and 
accountability plays, in not only aiding instituted corruption control measures, but also to 
attenuate and eradicate the adverse effects of the vice. In consequence, a telling case is made for 
strengthening the institutions that control corruption, in order to improve the Caribbean and 
Latin America`s living standards. The latter not only lends empirical credence to Mario Vargas 
(2015) contention that corruption is Latin America`s top problem, but it also shows that reining 
it in, among other things is vitally important. Also, this underscores Brunt (2007)`s overarching 
question regarding “which particular institutions matter for economic growth.” Policy wise, 
efforts expended in either reducing or eradicating corruption can benefit from increased levels 
of voice and accountability, akin to Kock and Gaskins (2014). Finally, a proxy of collective 
institutional quality, constructed and invoked as a composite index, also exerted benign effects 
on living standards, hence accentuating the significance of strengthening institutional quality, 
especially when purging the markets of functional inefficiencies. 
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 Chapter (I): Introduction 
 
                    The main purpose for this study is to ascertain how institutional quality, and 
particularly the control of corruption, affects output per capita across the Caribbean and Latin 
America. The study is literally a sequel to an age-old country prosperity question, pondered by a 
vast majority of economists such as Solow (1956), North (1990), and Sachs (2003), but mainly 
hankering after the answers to why some countries are richer than others, and why other 
economies remain poor. Adopting a production function approach, Solow (1956) submits that 
the divergences in output per capita across nations, is related to the accumulation of factors such 
as capital (physical and human), labor, and technology. On the other hand, North (1990) `s 
approach describes differences in revenue across countries as a function of institutions. He 
defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society, and that they formally constitute 
humanely devised constraints to shape human interaction.”Sachs (2003) espouses the view that 
the effects of geography and location determine differences in income and growth. 
                    However, though not confuting North (1990) `s submission that strong institutions 
matter, in not only explaining income variations, but also in improving living standards; this 
study uses recent data for the period between 1996 and 2010, coupled with specifying integral 
dimensions constituting institutional quality, such as Control of Corruption; Voice and 
Accountability; Political Stability and Non-violence; Government Effectiveness; Rule of Law; 
and Regulatory Quality to tease out the one that most significantly explains differences in living 
standards across the Caribbean and Latin America. 
                   The aforementioned notwithstanding, a composite index is constructed; 
incorporating the constituent features of institutional quality in the foregoing, and duly 
employed to affirm the relevance of institutions in the region under study. However, it is 
submitted in this study that there are particular institutional forms, which appropriately and 
effectively address the fundamental issues of securing property rights and removal of 
impediments to transactions, while also affording an environment that neither precludes 
movement, nor disrupts business operations. For example, as opposed to North and Weingast 
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(1989), Acemoglu et al (2005), plus Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), akin to Ogilvie and Carus 
(2014), strong parliaments do not invariably create institutions for growth, because powerful 
parliaments manned by wealth-holders, with considerable control over the executive, and 
strongly influencing economic policy; can still fail to manifest a natural diversity of views, by 
espousing homogeneous views, in which state power is deployed wherever possible to enforce 
their own legal privileges over factor and product markets. On the other hand, institutions 
guaranteeing private property rights and the ones enforcing contracts are central in affording 
citizens decent living standards. Even so, uniquely different problems call for particular 
institutions for either their reduction or eradication. 
                     Precisely stated, besides Latin America`s excessive dependence on commodity 
exports, drug-related violence, lack of competitiveness, and dismal education; the region has 
experienced relatively high levels of corruption, with Transparency International attaching 
higher prevalence indices of the vice to regional member countries such as Haiti 3  and 
Venezuela4, besides the myriad corruption scandals in Brazil and Mexico. Inveighed against by 
the Peruvian Nobel laureate, Mario Vargas (2015), corruption is reckoned as Latin America`s 
top problem, and blame is imputed to it for precluding the anticipated and touted emergence of 
Brazil and Chile5 as strong and developed economies. It suffices to note that the specificity of 
corruption as an unyielding regional problem, infers that regional member countries that up their 
game in controlling it, are bound to register above average living standards. 
 
                                                          
3 Corruption is a serious problem in Haiti. In 2015, Haiti ranked 161 out of the 177 countries measured on Transparency 
International's Corruption Perception Index, the lowest ranking in the Caribbean region. On the Corruption Perception Index, Haiti 
ranked 163 in 2014 and 164 in 2013. 
4 A 2014 Gallup poll found that 75% of Venezuelans believed that corruption was widespread throughout the Venezuelan 
government. 
5 “In December 2005 the mayor of Quillota, Luis Mella (Christian Democrat), alleged the government's Employment Generation 
Program (PGE) paid political allies for work that was not performed. The Public Ministry and the comptroller then initiated parallel 
investigations into the potential illicit use of public funds. Although earmarked for employment programs, these resources were 
possibly diverted to the political campaigns of Socialist Party and Party for Democracy candidates in the Fifth Region during the 
2005 congressional elections. The PGE investigations revealed that individuals paid to do public works actually spent their time 
campaigning for political parties” (Report on Human Rights Practices 2006: Chile) 
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(a) Study Motivation 
 
                    Understanding what explains income differences across countries, and ascertaining 
the channels via which institutions exert benign effects on output per capita remain alluring not 
just in academia, but also to me. For example, while citizens of the Bahamas and Puerto Rico 
enjoy relatively higher standards of living, Haiti and Venezuela still register abysmal 
comparable performances. So revisiting the age-old economic question of why countries are 
richer than others, by and large informed my decision to undertake this study. 
                    Besides, in concurring with anecdotal and extant empirical studies, all underscoring 
the significance of institutions in explaining income differences across countries, the same 
telling question pondered, but lexically made manifest in different forms, is which institutions 
matter for economic growth, and it is understandably gaining traction not just amongst students 
and economists, but it has also piqued my interest.While studies such as Brunt (2007), Bardhan 
(2005), and Carlin et al (2010) pose the same question of which institutions are consequential 
for boosting output per capita, this study extends its import to specifically ask which institutions 
fundamentally explain variations in the living standards of the Caribbean and Latin America. 
 
(b) Hypotheses 
(1) Higher levels of controlling corruption conduce to higher living standards. 
(2) Increased voice and accountability enhances control of corruption. 
(3) Increased institutional quality improves living standards. 
(c) Problem Statement 
                    A vast majority of countries in the Caribbean and Latin America still contend with 
below average standards of living, invariably bested by the Eastern Asian countries, such as 
South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and China, although by and large akin to African 
economies such as Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite the conspicuous 
desperate state of affairs in the region under study, in countries such as the Bahamas and Puerto 
Rico, the resident citizens still enjoy decent living standards; while in countries such as Haiti 
and Venezuela the citizens still lag behind in terms of well-being. 
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                    Although Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that “the sustained growth achieved in some 
Asian countries (including China) has been the outcome of the policy decisions taken by their 
leaders, and not of the institutions constraining them (see also Rodrik 1994),”Dellepiane (2006) 
submits that bad governance in Bolivia, one of Latin America`s poorest and most unstable 
countries, has been both the source and the consequence of its economic underperformance. 
Indeed recent corruption scandals in Brazil6 have re-awakened the debate whether this once 
promising Latin American country has stagnated due to deep-seated institutional issues, alluding 
to, inter alia, corruption and bad governance. In Brazil the then President, Mr. Lula Da Silva, 
along with several top politicians are being investigated for having received kickbacks from 
Petrobras, the nation`s biggest oil company, hence occasioning nationwide anti-corruption 
protests. The latter recent events infer the very reason why disparities in output per capita still 
exist in the Caribbean and Latin America; and only empirical findings from contemporary data 
remain to lend their credence. 
                    In chapter II the extant literature is reviewed, chapter III expatiates on econometric 
issues, the methodology adopted, and the data used. In chapter IV and V the results are 
presented and main findings discussed, while Chapter VI comprises the study`s pertinent policy 
implications, recommendations for further research, and conclusive remarks. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6“Brazilian prosecutors say that executives from the state-run oil firm PetróleoBrasileiro SA and some of the nation’s largest 
construction firms colluded for more than a decade to inflate the price of contracts, kicking back a portion of the ill-gotten gains to 
lawmakers and other political officials. Executives from the company’s biggest construction companies and roughly 50 politicians 
have been accused, including the heads of Brazil’s senate and lower house. Eduardo Cunha, Brazil’s powerful speaker of the lower 
house of Congress, and Sen. Delcídio do Amaral, a member of the Workers’ Party and the Senate whip, have denied wrongdoing. 
While the corruption scandal roils the country’s political class, Brazil’s economy continues to suffer. Unemployment is rising, the 
country’s currency has crumbled, and this week the government reported its worst economic performance in 25 years, as the GDP 
contracted 3.8%. Ms. Rousseff’s finance minister, Joaquim Levy, stepped down late last year after intense scrutiny, and was 
replaced by a minister many analysts think is less market-friendly. The corruption probe has paralyzed much of the oil and 
construction sectors, pillars of the local economy, which led in part to Brazil losing its sovereign-credit rating last year (See Connors 
Will, “5 things to know about Brazil`s corruption scandal,” The Wall Street Journal, 4/03/2016). 
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Chapter (II): Literature Review 
 
                    Gwartney et al (2004) broach three types of interpretations for the differences in 
income levels and economic performance across countries. The most entrenched interpretation 
is based on the work of Solow (1956), which follows a production function approach, The 
second one, based on the works of North (1990) and Landes (1998), justify variations in income 
and growth across countries as a function of institutions, The third type, espoused by Sachs 
(2003), underscores as determinants of economic performance, the effects of geography and 
location. According to Solow (1956), output is augmented not only by expanding the amount of 
capital and labor, but also the production function could be influence by technological 
improvements, so that more output can be obtained with the same quantity of inputs. The latter 
thesis presumes that better growth rates can be obtained by increasing inputs into the production 
function, and by ascertaining ways to employ the inputs more productively.            
                    Central to the institutional approach to growth, is the conception that both the 
availability and productivity of resources will be impacted by the institutional and policy 
environment North (1993).According to North (1993), “institutions as the formal and informal 
rules governing human interactions, or, the set of rules that articulate and organize economic, 
social and political interactions between individuals and social groups;” exert benign effects on 
economic growth. For North (1990), institutions affect the performance of economies, and that 
the current economic differences among countries are due to the ways these institutions have 
evolved, and their current quality. However, there isn’t yet a consensus about the main features 
or characteristics of the institutions that are most appropriate for prosperity. Worthy to note is 
that a vast majority of economists, such as Gwartney et al (2004) concur “that secure property 
rights are crucial, and that the impediments to exchange must be minimal,” but economists such 
as Brunt (2007), Bardhan (2005), and Carlin et al (2010) literally ask which institutions are 
consequential for boosting output per capita,  and in attempting to answer this telling question 
this study empirically investigates how the overarching institutional forms have performed in 
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the Caribbean and Latin America. Precisely stated, debate still exists pertaining to which 
institutional forms guarantee and sustain economic success. 
                   A third approach to ascertaining factors that conduce to prosperity across countries 
focuses on geographical factors. Promoted by Jeffrey Sachs (2003), geography and location are 
broached as the most important determinants of cross-country differences in income levels and 
economic performance. Sachs believes that the import of three major geographic-locational 
factors, which comprise a tropical climate, access to an ocean point, and the air distance of a 
country from the world`s major trading centers, such as London, Rotterdam, New York, among 
others. According to Sachs, a tropical climate precludes economic growth because of the 
heightened menace carriage by diseases such as malaria, and that a hot and humid climate 
impinges on the energy level of people and labor productivity. For Sachs (2003), the lack of 
access to an ocean port infers higher transaction costs, and inadequate trade with a sizeable 
portion of the global population. A distant location from the major world markets also preclude 
not just trade, but will affect negatively the gains from division of labor, specialization, and 
economies of scale. The aforementioned geographic and locational factors make a country less 
alluring as a base for production, hence compromising its capacity to attract foreign capital. 
                    Akin to Gwartney et al (2004), this study infers that “if appropriate institutions are 
in place, the market system provides an incentive for market participants to invest in human and 
physical capital, and to improve their methods of production through innovation. The 
production function still focuses on policies that will increase the quantity and improve the 
productivity of capital and labor. More so, Sach`s approach literally invokes policies geared 
towards controlling tropical diseases, coupled with applicable technology to improve the 
productivity of resources in tropical regions.” Besides, Acemoglu et al (2001) find in their study 
that geography is insignificant in explaining cross-country income differences once formal 
institutions are controlled for. It is also affirmed by Rodrik et al (2004), plus Easterly and 
Levine (2003) that the only effect geography has on income per capita is an indirect effect, 
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plausibly via institutions. It is against this background the geography factors are discounted in 
this study.  
                    Invoking the modern and comprehensive World Bank`s WGI indicators to proxy 
institutions, including a self-constructed composite index from them to collectively measure 
institutional quality, this study traces their individual and collective effects on living standards 
in the Caribbean and Latin America. While not all economists such as Glaeser et al (2004); 
Fogel (2004), Schmid (2006); plus Mcarthur and Sachs (2001) agree that institutions are major 
ingredients for growth; premised on the view that it is corruption that is prejudicing the 
Caribbean and Latin America the most, this study makes a telling case for the institutions 
controlling corruption as veritable platforms for improving the region`s living standards. 
                    Previous empirical research on corruption, such as Mauro (1995, 1997, and 1998); 
Tanzi (1998); Kaufmann and Wei (1999); Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004); plus Gupta et al (2001 
and 2002) found that corruption impinges on economic growth. Other studies such as Mauro 
(1995); Tanzi (1997); Gupta (2000); Gyimah-Brempong (2001), among others, suggest the 
following four plausible channels via which corruption prejudices economic growth: orruption 
distorts incentives and market forces, leading to misallocation of resources; corruption diverts 
talent and resources, including human resources, towards “lucrative” rent-seeking activities, 
such as defense, rather than productive activities; corruption acts as an inefficient tax on 
business, ultimately raising production costs and reducing the profitability of investments; and 
corruption may also decrease the productivity of investments by reducing the quality of 
resources. For example, by undermining the quality and quantity of health and education 
services, corruption decreases a country’s human capital. Besides, rent-seeking behavior is also 
likely to create inefficiencies, fuelling waste of resources and undermining the efficiency of 
public expenditure.  
                    Worth mentioning, the extant literature on corruption against economic growth 
presents arguments for and against corruption, with also studies such as Leff (1964) and 
Hunnington (1968) submitting that corruption is the necessary “grease” for lubricating the stiff 
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wheels of rigid government administration, by facilitating the circumvention of bureaucratic 
arrangements. Precisely stated, the latter studies suggest that corruption may boost economic 
growth. However, this study contributes to the existing literature by accentuating the mechanism 
via which the institutions for controlling corruption can be aided, i.e. through increased levels of 
voice and accountability, which can potentially make corruption visible, and hence manageable. 
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Chapter (III): Econometric Model Specification And Data 
                    The regression specification employed in this study is premised on a combination 
of growth theories espoused by Solow (1956), Romer (1986), plus Lucas (1988) and North 
(1990). In consequence, akin to Siddiqui and Ahmed (2009), to explain income differences 
across the Caribbean and Latin America, GDP Per Capita as a linear function of institutional 
quality indicators, and their related author-computed composite indices, while controlling for, 
inter alia, capital, education, and trade openness is empirically investigated. Below is the basic 
form of the estimated relation: 
IPCIit= β0 + β1GCFit + β2GDSit + β3TRAit+ β4EDUCit +β5PSNit +β6GEit + β7RQit + β8ROLit + 
β9VAit + β10COCit +  
µ…………………………….. (1) 
IPCIit= β0 + β1GCFit + β2GDSit + β3TRAit + β4EDUCit +βnZit +  
 
µ……………………………………………………………………………………. (2) 
 
Where: 
 
IPC= GDP Per Capita 
PSN= Political Stability and Non-violence 
GE= Government Effectiveness 
RQ= Regulatory Quality 
ROL= Rule of Law 
VA= Voice & Accountability 
COC= Control of Corruption 
µ = Error Term 
IQI3= PSN, ROL, and COC                              
IQI7= VA, PSN, RQ, ROL, and COC                       Institutional Quality Indices 
                                                                  
 
The aforementioned composite institutional quality indices are author-computed. Z= is a vector 
of control variables to be specified in the discussion of results, comprising GCF, GDS, TRA, 
and EDUC as specified in the next Table 1. Different specifications are used to both assess the 
robustness of the econometric models; and to examine the impact of adding the latter control 
variables. The employed methodology incorporates variability both across countries (i) and over 
time (t), in a pooled cross-sectional analysis. In the widest forms, the regressions in the 
foregoing are estimated using 510 observations on 34 countries. 
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Table 1: Data and their related sources 
 
Variable Abbreviation Description Source 
GDP Per Capita (fixed 2000 
US$) 
IPC Main dependent 
variable 
World Bank-World 
Development Indicator 
Gross Capital Formation(% of 
GDP) 
GCF Control variable World Bank-World 
Development Indicator 
Gross Domestic Savings (% of 
GDP) 
GDS Control variable World Bank-World 
Development Indicator 
Trade Openness (Trade as % 
of GDP) 
TRA Control variable World Bank-World 
Development Indicator 
Voice & Accountability VA Independent 
variable 
World Bank-World 
Development Indicator 
Political Stability & Non 
violence 
PSN Independent 
variable 
World Bank-World 
Development Indicator 
Government Effectiveness GE Independent 
variable 
World Bank-World 
Development Indicator 
Regulatory Quality RQ Independent 
variable 
World Bank-World 
Development Indicator 
Rule of Law ROL Independent 
variable 
World Bank-World 
Development Indicator 
Control of Corruption COC Independent 
variable 
World Bank-World 
Development Indicator 
Education EDUC Independent 
variable 
World Bank-World 
Development Indicator 
Institutional Quality Index IQI Independent 
variable 
Author constructed 
 
(a) Data 
                    GDP Per Capita is the main dependent variable, and proxy for standard of living, as 
used in studies such as Kraay and Kaufmann (2002). Also inferred by Douglas (2003) as Per 
Capita Real GDP, the standard of living is basically defined as the ratio of real GDP and the 
population of a given country7. 
                    As per Solow (1956), to proxy physical capital as a telling factor for explaining 
variations in standards of living across countries, the Gross Capital Formation is used.  
Formerly known as the gross domestic investment, GCF as per the World Bank consists of 
                                                          
7See the appendix I to see the economic performance of Latin America and Caribbean. 
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outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy, plus net changes in the level of 
inventories. Fixed assets comprise land improvements (such as fences, ditches, drains, and so 
on); plant, machinery, equipment purchases; the construction of roads and railways, coupled 
with schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, plus commercial and industrial 
buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected 
fluctuations in production or sales, including works in progress. 
                    Douglas (2003) submits that “in a country with population growth and diminishing 
marginal productivity, what is necessary for improvements to living standards are additions to 
the capital stock, the level of technology, or both. These additions increase the productivity of 
workers, and allow for more output for each and every labor input. Hence the creation and 
accumulation of capital is intended to increase the level of a nation`s productivity;” inferring a 
positive correlation between capital and the standard of living. 
                   Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure 
(total consumption). Christened by Economists as the “seed-corn” of the economy, Lawrence 
(2001) submits that savings are akin “to a farmer who does not eat all his corn at harvest time 
but instead, puts some aside to plant next year. Savings are the primary source of capital, which 
is the lifeblood of an economy.  Capital refers to accumulated funds (savings) that an 
entrepreneur invests for future production. When a person starts a small business, for instance, 
he has no revenue yet from sales because he has not yet produced a product.  Yet, he needs 
funds to buy the machinery, plant and equipment and hire the workers that he will need to get 
things going.  He funds these early start-up necessities either by using his own savings or by 
borrowing the savings of others from a bank. Savings can be in the form of the build-up of 
equity in a person's home, or the stocks and bonds he has purchased and thereby allowed others 
to use for productive purposes in business. Hence a positive correlation between savings and 
living standards is expected. 
                    In this study, trade openness is simply defined as the total trade volume (exports 
plus imports) relative to GDP. Invoking the concept of comparative advantage, Dixit and 
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Norman (1980) explain that the conventional trade theory determines the patterns of 
international trade and the allocation of profit across countries in a static setting. He also states 
that nations that engage in international trade, will necessarily specialize in goods whose 
production processes foster relatively reduce opportunity costs prior to trade than the other 
country. In consequence, a country`s exports are constituted by goods in which it has a 
comparative advantage. 
                    Furthermore, Andersen and Babula (2008) explain that comparative advantage is 
derived from either exogenous technological differences (the classical Ricardian model) or 
different factor endowments (the Heckscher-Ohlin model); hence associating international trade 
with a redistribution of resources within the national borders, determined by exogenous 
differences across countries. It is the latter reallocation of resources which generates efficiency 
gains that increase the level of aggregate national income. 
                    Adopting static models of monopolistic completion and economies of scale, 
Krugman (1979 and 1980) suggests two other sources of gains from international trade. For 
starters, opening up for trade between two countries that make differentiated products means 
that there are more varieties available for consumption, which is a source of gain for consumers. 
Also, Andersen and Babula (2008) submit that “openness to international flows of capital may 
raise the speed at which physical capita and human capital are accumulated locally (at least 
temporarily). Second, openness may speed up productivity growth through faster technological 
progress. Various theoretical links between trade, productivity, and growth exist in the 
innovation-based growth studies of Grossman and Helpman (1991) plus Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer (1991). International trade can, suffice it to say, improve a nation`s living standards by 
giving access to foreign intermediate inputs and technologies; expanding the market size for 
new product varieties; and facilitating the international diffusion of knowledge. He a positive 
correlation between trade openness and living standards is expected.  
                    According to the World Bank, the Voice and accountability indicator captures 
perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
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government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
Additionally, Foresti et al (2009) submit that “voice is about poor people expressing their views 
and interests in an effort to influence government priorities and governance processes. 
Accountability exists when those who set and implement a society’s rules – politicians and 
public officials – are answerable to the people who live under those rules. Voice and 
accountability are separate but related concepts. In some contexts, voice can lead to greater 
accountability. In most contexts, a lack of voice will lead to a lack of accountability. Voice and 
accountability matter for development for two sets of reasons. First, powerlessness, 
voicelessness and a lack of accountability are constitutive of poverty. As such, enhancing voice 
and accountability leads in itself to a reduction in poverty. Second, voice and accountability can 
lead to other outcomes such as greater ownership and pro-poor policies which can lead to a 
reduction in poverty.” Therefore a positive correlation between VA and living standards is 
expected. 
                    The political stability and non-violence index measures perceptions of the 
likelihood of political instability and politically motivated violence, including terrorism. Acts of 
terrorism, civil war, plus protests and riots cause not only damage to assets, but also injure and 
liquidate people, including disruption of normal movement and paralysis of business operations. 
Especially when protracted or intermittent, political instability and violence impinge on output 
per capita, hence PSN affords the business community and general workforce a conducive 
environment to sustain and perpetuate the production of goods and services. Therefore a 
positive correlation between PSN and IPC is expected. 
                    According to the World Bank, the government effectiveness index captures 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government`s commitment to such policies. Yang (2010) even further 
submits that “government performance can influence a country`s human development.”He 
contends that “effective governments are more likely to make firm and efficient policies that are 
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beneficial to human development.” Additionally, Salhi and Bolle (2007) infer that both 
autocratic and democratic governments are wont to spend because they are ultimately assessed 
by the economic welfare they create for their citizens, either through improved GDP Per Capita, 
redistributive monetary transfers, or the provision of public goods. Alluding to government 
effectiveness, Katumba (2016) makes a telling deduction that “the political survival of 
incumbent governments is a function of the quantity and quality of delivered public goods and 
services.” By and large, governments that are consistently effective in delivering excellent 
services to their citizens can impose a benign effect on their living standards. Therefore, a 
positive correlation between GE and IPC is expected. 
                    In order to reflect at least in part the supervisory role of government as a regulator 
in the economic environment, this study adopts the World Bank`s Regulatory Quality Index, 
which reflects “the ability of the government to provide sound policies and regulations that 
enable and promote private sector development.” Akin to Cabula and Clark (2014), a positive 
correlation between RQ and IPC is expected.  
                    The World Bank`s Rule of Law Index “captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have coincidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence.” Central to secure property rights is the overarching idea that growth is a 
function of investment, and that investors scarcely invest if there is a risk of any kind of 
expropriation. Besley and Ghatak (2009) submit that secure property rights influence economic 
performance and resource distribution. They explain the four channels via which the latter 
happens thus: 
(1) The security channel: whereby a flow of income is counted upon to be led by investment, 
and requires protection against expropriation through secure, well defined property rights. Such 
protection provides the incentive to invest; and by implication, insecure property rights could 
mean that the economic agent may de deficient to appreciate the fruits of their investment 
efforts. 
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(2) The efficiency channel: That enhances the mobility of assets through transactions on which 
such assets are relocated to those who can take advantage of them most productively. 
(3) Reduced protection costs: secure property rights results on individuals applying less 
resources to protecting their property (an unproductive use of resources) and these resources can 
be redistributed to productive uses. 
(4) Transactions facilitation: property rights allow their use in supporting other transactions, by 
employing them as collateral to raise resources on the financial market. The latter may increase 
productivity along the lines delineated by De Soto (2000). Hence a positive correlation is 
expected between ROL and IPC. 
                    The Control of Corruption index captures, as per the World Bank, “the perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as state exploitation by elites and private interests. It also measures 
the strength and effectiveness of a country’s policy and institutional framework to prevent and 
combat corruption.”Actually, Peruvian-born Nobel Prize winner, Mario Vargas Llosa, famously 
stated in a public interview with the Miami Herald`s journalist, Oppenheimer (2015) that “Latin 
America`s top problem is corruption.” Indeed one can impute blame to corruption as Lula Da 
Silva`s government saw Brazil`s economic emergence nipped in the bud. Oppenheimer (2015) 
argues that “Brazil was neither hit by a devastating economic blow from abroad, nor suffered a 
natural disaster. Its economy collapsed in 2015 amid growing political scandal over the national 
Petrobras oil company`s kickbacks to ruling party politicians. The anti-corruption protests that 
ensued just manifested an already deep-seated problem, the kind that engendered the 
plummeting of Brazil`s economy. The same goes for Mexico, Chile, Venezuela, and Argentina; 
where corruption has grossly prejudiced local living standards. Corruption and financial sector 
inefficiencies conduce to market inefficiencies, which circumscribe factor productivity growth, 
and then impinge on living standards. Reining in corruption through anti-corruption programs 
and policies is thus bound to exert a benign effect on living standards. 
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                    Access to education by and large not only affords a person with the requisite skills 
hankered after by the labor sector, but it also suffuses one with entrepreneurship salutary 
abilities that enhance and supplement their inherent repertoire. By improving human capital, 
quality education attainment betters one`s living standards, hence a positive correlation is 
expected between EDUC and IPC, akin to Solow (1956) `s submission.Now, while the effect of 
the institutional factor on output per capita in the extant literature has a myriad of proxies, this 
study invokes thePSN, VA, GE, ROL, RQ, and COC indices. Most importantly, the study 
focuses on constituents of institutions that not only ensure secure property rights and remove 
impediments to transactions, but also afford the labor industry an environment that scarcely 
interrupts its income-generating operations and movements. 
                  Against this backdrop, a composite index, incorporating the aforementioned 
institutional quality indicators is author-constructed, to assess its collective effect on living 
standards in the Caribbean and Latin America. A positive correlation between IQI and IPC is 
expected, in support and affirmation of how strong individual institutions plausibly boost living 
standards, as explained in this study thus far.Worth mentioning though, is that while the existing 
theoretical frameworks in the literature almost corporately support the view that institutions, as 
manifested and proxyied by their constituents, exert benign effects on output per capita; a 
myriad of studies where fused or individual institutional indices are invoked, however either 
tenuously support this view, or confute it as highlighted in the review of the extant literature. 
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Chapter (IV): Empirical Results 
                Summary statistics for all the variables are given in Table 2 below, which also 
includes the correlation matrix 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
         Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 
IPC GCF GDS TRA VA PSN GE RQ ROL COC IQI 
Obs 510 510.00 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 
Mean 5016 22.92 15.28 5554345 0.29 0.00 -0.02 0.07 -0.15 0.01 0.38 
Std. Dev. 4379 6.80 10.64 10300000 0.68 0.75 0.67 0.69 0.79 0.79 0.80 
Min 371 8.50 
-
24.60 19863 -1.87 
-
2.39 -1.68 -1.69 -1.91 -1.82 -0.17 
Max 21809 49.18 59.80 68800000 1.47 1.41 1.60 1.64 1.45 1.76 7.31 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix With Logarithmic Variables 
 
IPC GCF GDS TRA VA PSN GE RQ ROL COC IQI 
IPC 1.00 
        
  
 
GCF 0.13 1.00 
       
  
 
GDS 0.27 0.07 1.00 
      
  
 
TRA -0.19 -0.51 0.36 1.00 
     
  
 
VA -0.11 -0.39 -0.12 0.19 1.00 
    
  
 
PSN 0.29 -0.07 -0.10 -0.34 0.22 1.00 
   
  
 
GE 0.49 -0.10 0.26 0.16 0.30 0.15 1.00 
  
  
 
RQ 0.16 -0.08 0.27 0.29 0.15 
-
0.10 0.64 1.00 
 
  
 
ROL 0.38 -0.08 0.36 0.10 0.15 0.32 0.66 0.61 1.00   
 
COC 0.50 -0.16 0.26 0.14 0.21 0.43 0.77 0.45 0.58 1.00 
 
IQI 0.32 -0.22 0.20 0.21 0.40 0.21 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.50 1.00 
 
                   
Table 3 indicates that countries with relatively higher IQ indicators, by and large registered 
income per capita above the sampled group`s average income per capita of US$ 5016, plausibly 
lending credence to the positive role strong institutions play in standards of living.  
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Table 3: Sampled countries and their mean variables (1996-2010) 
 
COUNTRY MIPC MVA MPSN MGE MRQ MROL MCOC 
BAHAMAS 20672.913 1.04 0.96 1.13 0.87 1.05 1.24 
PUERTORICO 16302.71 0.96 0.36 0.74 1.02 0.76 0.67 
ANTIGUABARBUDA 11464.298 0.49 0.84 0.51 0.64 0.96 1.08 
BARBADOS 9231.475 1.22 1.08 1.39 0.88 1.19 1.38 
ST. KITTS AND 
NEVIS 
8978.502 1.05 1.08 0.35 0.46 0.72 0.65 
ARGENTINA 8279.193 0.29 -0.13 -0.07 -0.52 -0.57 -0.30 
TRINIDADANDTOBA
GO 
8059.37 0.55 -0.03 0.29 0.56 0.01 -0.08 
URUGUAY 7182.147 0.99 0.77 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.91 
MEXICO 5788.856 0.14 -0.55 0.21 0.36 -0.53 -0.31 
CHILE 5369.959 0.99 0.54 1.21 1.48 1.26 1.33 
DOMINICA 5169.599 1.03 0.84 0.48 0.57 0.67 0.59 
VENEZUELA 5076.384 -0.64 -1.12 -0.99 -1.10 -1.25 -1.03 
GRENADA 5025.234 0.76 0.60 0.27 0.37 0.22 0.48 
GROUP AVERAGE 5015.9291 0.29 0.00 -0.02 0.07 -0.15 0.01 
ST. LUCIA 4757.053 1.12 0.83 0.42 0.47 0.74 0.78 
PANAMA 4427.567 0.49 0.01 0.13 0.42 -0.16 -0.35 
COSTA RICA 4389.964 1.00 0.67 0.29 0.53 0.51 0.49 
ST. VINCENT AND 
THE GRENADINES 
4117.893 1.04 0.90 0.43 0.44 0.79 0.69 
BRAZIL 3951.348 0.35 -0.12 -0.07 0.17 -0.28 -0.06 
JAMAICA 3644.844 0.17 -0.17 0.13 0.25 -0.44 -0.43 
BELIZE 3403.5 0.72 0.23 -0.23 -0.25 -0.20 -0.07 
CUBA 3282.626 -1.66 0.30 -0.43 -1.50 -0.83 0.38 
DOMINICANREPUBL
IC 
3054.315 0.06 -0.10 -0.54 -0.22 -0.64 -0.52 
COLOMBIA 2769.166 -0.30 -1.76 -0.12 0.16 -0.59 -0.16 
PERU 2367.54 -0.06 -0.94 -0.29 0.36 -0.65 -0.33 
ELSALVADOR 2336.125 0.02 0.01 -0.28 0.19 -0.68 -0.44 
SURINAME 2230.894 0.28 0.20 -0.19 -0.58 -0.15 0.00 
GUATEMALA 1753.829 -0.33 -0.82 -0.60 -0.17 -1.08 -0.56 
ECUADOR 1481.407 -0.26 -0.70 -0.74 -0.83 -0.93 -0.85 
PARAGUAY 1411.975 -0.30 -0.78 -0.93 -0.55 -0.99 -1.06 
HONDURAS 1245.769 -0.33 -0.43 -0.63 -0.32 -0.88 -0.87 
BOLIVIA 1067.124 -0.03 -0.56 -0.43 -0.47 -0.76 -0.55 
GUYANA 1028.621 0.18 -0.50 -0.19 -0.46 -0.55 -0.52 
NICARAGUA 817.291 -0.26 -0.32 -0.81 -0.32 -0.74 -0.66 
HAITI 402.099 -0.90 -1.19 -1.47 -0.99 -1.54 -1.30 
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                    A cursory look at Table 4 below infers that in the sampled group, countries with 
relatively superior government effectiveness registered above-average income per capita, in 
affirmation of Kaufmann and Kraay (2002)`s study. 
Table 4: Relationship between Income per Capita and Government Effectiveness 
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  Table 5 below shows that economies which strengthen institutions for reining in 
corruption are bound to relatively register improved standards of living. As per New Americas 
Now (2015), “Venezuela and Haiti are the most corrupt countries in the Caribbean and Latin 
America. Both nations have ranked at a low 19 on the TI Index for the past three years – 
between 2012 and 2014. In Venezuela corruption is rampant in the main oil industry. Large-
scale corruption is alleged to have taken place at the state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela 
(PDVSA), and other state entities. Political power is concentrated in the executive, with many 
opportunities for corruption. Capital controls, for example, allow officials to purchase U.S. 
dollars at a fixed peg and then sell them on the black market for as much as a 1,100 percent 
profit which has led to widespread smuggling and other illegal activities. 
                        In Haiti corruption is rampant, the judicial system is ineffective and inefficient 
and smuggling remains a huge problem that is exacerbated by poor trade freedom. Haiti is also a 
major narco-trafficking transshipment point and the dysfunctional judicial system is 
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underfunded making it open to corruption.” All the aforementioned affirm this study`s 
revelations that countries such as Venezuela and Haiti, with conspicuously tenuous controls on 
corruption register relatively lower standards of living. 
Table 5: Relationship between per capita GDP and control on corruption 
 
 
 
  
                   A look at Table 6 shows how the Voice and Accountability Index was co-moving 
with the Control of Corruption Index. By and large, where VA spikes were manifested, similar 
COC spikes were registered and huge troughs in VA are followed with conspicuously 
corresponding depressions in COC. To a plausible extent, VA complements COC, suggesting 
that expended efforts to combat and prevent corruption can benefit from increased levels of 
voice and accountability. 
 
 
 
 
29
Table 6: Co-Movement between Control of Corruption Plus Voice and Accountability 
 
 
 
4.1 Testing for Random Effects: Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
                    The LM test helps to decide between a random effects regression and a simple OLS 
regression. In the LM test, the null hypothesis is that the variance across entities is zero (i.e. 
there are no significant differences across units and thus there is no panel effect. As per Table 7 
below, there is evidence of significant differences across countries, ostensibly qualifying the 
Random Effects regression, and in consequence obviating with the need of running a simple 
OLS regression. 
Table 7: Choosing between the OLS and Random Effects Regression 
 
 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
                              chi2(1) =   343.20
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .3735473       .6111851
                       e     .0049912       .0706482
                    lipc     .2428425       .4927905
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        lipc[country1,t] = Xb + u[country1] + e[country1,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
 
 
4.2  Choosing between the Fixed and Random Effects: Hausman Test 
 
                    According to Green, a Hausman test is run to decide between fixed or random 
effects regression, in which the null hypothesis is that the preferred model effects vs. the 
alternative fixed effects (Green, 2008). It seeks to ascertain whether the unique errors (µ i) are 
correlated with the regressors, of which the null hypothesis is that they are not. Table 8 shows 
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that since the P-value is statistically significant, the fixed effects would be more appropriate in 
this study. 
 
Table 8: Choosing Between Fixed and Random Effects (The Hausman Test). 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       52.17
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
        lcoc      .0326955     .0451045        -.012409               .
        lrol     -.0016956    -.0046224        .0029267               .
         lrq     -.0184381    -.0269568        .0085187               .
        lpsn     -.0571273    -.0583859        .0012586               .
         lva      .1063099     .1196816       -.0133717               .
        ltra      .2095886     .1571248        .0524639        .0068173
        lgds     -.0330166     -.032604       -.0004125               .
        lgcf      .0104958     .0325691       -.0220732               .
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
 
 
4.3 A Cross-Sectional Dependence Test (Contemporaneous Correlation). 
                   According to Baltagi (2005),”cross-sectional dependence is a problem in macro 
panels with long time series (over 20-30 years).” This is not only much complicated in micro 
panels (few years and large number of cases), but this study`s employed data spans a period of 
14 years, from 1996 to 2010, inferring that the residuals across entities are not correlated.Table 
9 in the next page reports the fixed effects regression findings, which by and large infer strong 
and positive statistical significance for Control of Corruption against GDP Per Capita (See 
alsoTable 5). 
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Chapter (V): Regression Results 
(a) Voice and accountability 
                    Akin to Kock and Gaskins (2013), in Table 9 myriad fixed effects regressions VA 
was not only statistically significant, at 1% level, but there was also a positive correlation 
between it and IPC. To ascertain the plausible channel via which VA works to improve living 
standards, a combined factorCVA of it and COC was regressed against IPC, eliciting a 
statistically significant and positive coefficient, which remained robust in all the empirical 
models specified (See Table 10 appended to this study). 
(b) Political Stability and Non-Violence 
                   Akin to De Gregorio (1992), it was found in this study, as shown in Table 9 that 
though rather statistically significant, PSN was negatively correlated to IPC.  
Table 9: Fixed Effects Regression Results 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
GDP Per Capita 
       Gross Capital 
Formation 
0.01093 
(0.28) 
0.005 
(0.13) 
0.0042 
(0.10) 
0.0121 
(0.31) 
0.026 
(0.65) 
-0.016 
(-0.58) 
-0.017 
(-0.63) 
Gross Domestic 
Saving 
-0.0301 
(-2.07)** 
-0.0333 
(-2.46) 
-0.0497 
(-3.29)*** 
-0.038 
(-2.5)** 
-0.0468 
 (-3.23)*** 
-0.008 
(-0.76) 
-0.0071 
(-0.71) 
Trade Openness 0.2345 
(8.93)*** 
0.2203 
(8.37)*** 
0.2333 
(8.11)*** 
0.226 
(8.12)*** 
0.2181 
(7.85)*** 
0.19 
(12.39)*** 
0.1859 
(12.21)*** 
Voice & 
Accountability 
0.1075 
 (2.65)*** 
0.1113 
 (3.2)*** 
 0.145 
 (3.28)*** 
0.1441  
(3.60)*** 
 
 Political 
Stability & 
Non-violence 
-0.0263 
(-1.34) 
-0.0558 
(-2.8)*** 
-0.0818 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.0553 
(-2.19)** 
-0.0938 
 (-3.41)*** 
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
  -0.0253 
(-1.19) 
0.0086 
(0.57) 
-0.0305 
(-1.5) 
  
Regulatory 
Quality 
       
Rule of law -0.0082 
(-0.30) 
  -0.0181 
(-0.5) 
   
Control of 
corruption 
 0.0213 
(1.8) 
0.0598 
(2.20)** 
 0.0540 
(2.07)** 
 
 Education      0.098 
(4.12)*** 
0.0957 
(4.04)*** 
Institutional 
Quality Index 
(IQI3) 
      0.0303 
 (2.12)*** 
Institutional 
Quality Index 
(IQI7) 
     0.0177 
(2.17)** 
 
Detailed related STATA 11 estimation result sheets appended to this report. T-statistics in 
parentheses, where ***P≤ 0.01; **P≤0.05; *P≤0.10 denote levels of statistical significance. 
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(c)  Control of Corruption 
                   Table 9 shows that COC was positively correlated to IPC and statistically significant 
at 2% level. This finding plausibly infers that increased levels of corruption control conduce to 
increased levels of output per capita. 
(d) Education and Trade Openness 
                    In Table 9, both EDUC and TRA were not only positively correlated to IPC, but 
were also statistically significant at 1% level. The latter results are as expected, given 
education`s beneficial effects on human development through requisite skill acquisition, and the 
technology transfer afforded by international trade, including the enhanced variety of goods and 
services. 
(e) Institutional Quality Composite Indices (IQI38 and IQI79) 
                     Table 9 shows that IQI3, as defined earlier in this study, is positively correlated to 
IPC, and statistically significant at 1% level. Also, IQI7, latterly defined in this study, is 
positively correlated to IPC and statistically significant at 2% level. These findings suggest that 
countries benefit from particular institutional forms, and for this region, control of corruption, in 
conjunction with the mediating voice and accountability are the most overarching.In Table 10, 
with random effects regressions, the factors that are positively correlated to IPC include TRA, 
EDUC, VA, COC, and IQI3; all with statistical significance at 1% level. IQI7 was positively 
correlated to IPC and statistically significant at 2% level.Table 11 (appended to this report) 
shows that CVA, the factor combining both control of corruption, plus voice and accountability, 
was positively correlated to IPC, and statistically significant. 
 
 
  
                                                          
8IQI3= PSN, ROL, and COC             
9IQI7= VA, PSN, RQ, ROL, and COC 
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Table 10: Random Effects Regression Results 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        Gross Capital 
Formation 
0.0237 
 (0.59) 
0.0419 
 (0.97) 
0.031 
 (0.69) 
0.025 
 (0.61) 
0.054 
 (1.25) 
-0.0062 
 (-0.21) 
-0.0064 
(-0.22) 
Gross 
Domestic 
Saving 
-0.0308 
(-2.02)** 
-0.033  
(-2.14)** 
-0.0503 
 (-
3.06)*** 
-0.0385 
(-2.44)** 
-0.047 
(-
2.95)*** 
-0.0069 
(-0.64) 
-0.0067 
(-0.61) 
Trade 
Openness 
0.2051 
(7.99)*** 
0.148 
(5.74)*** 
0.1694 
 
(6.11)*** 
0.196 
(7.19)*** 
0.156 
 
(5.86)*** 
0.157 
 
(9.96)*** 
0.1485 
(9.46)*** 
Voice & 
Accountability 
0.118 
(2.81)*** 
0.138 
(3.53)*** 
 
0.1525 
(3.29)*** 
0.163 
(3.75)*** 
  Political 
Stability & 
Non-violence 
-0.0222 
(-1.09) 
-0.05 
(-2.2)** 
-0.0889 
(-
2.87)*** 
-0.0502 
(-1.91) 
-0.102 
(-3.4)*** 
 Government 
Effectiveness 
  -0.0305 
(-1.32) 
0.0117 
(0.74) 
-0.0359 
(-1.62) 
 
 Regulatory 
Quality 
     
  Rule of law 0.0022 
(0.08) 
  -0.0036 
(-0.1) 
 
  Control of 
corruption 
 0.037 
(2.81)*** 
0.087 
(0.003)** 
 0.078 
(2.79)*** 
Education      0.125 
(4.94)*** 
0.1266 
(4.97)*** 
Institutional 
Quality Index 
(IQI3) 
      0.0452 
(2.90)*** 
Institutional 
Quality Index 
(IQI7) 
     
0.0196 
(2.22)** 
 Detailed related STATA 11 estimation result sheets appended to this report. Z-statistics in 
parentheses, where ***P≤ 0.01; **P≤0.05; *P≤0.10 denote levels of statistical significance. 
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Chapter (VI): Policy Implications And Conclusion 
                   In this Caribbean and Latin American study, besides a constructed composite index 
to proxy institutional quality, particular forms of institution from Kaufmann et al (2009) `s 
comprehensive Worldwide Governance Indicators, coupled with control variables were 
regressed against Real GDP Per Capita, for a period between 1996 and 2010 in fixed and 
random effects models. It was discovered from the regression analysis that among the particular 
institution indicators investigated, control of corruption, plus voice and accountability were 
positively correlated to output per capita, and were statistically significant and robust in all 
econometric models specified. The overarching lesson from the study infers that increased 
levels of voice and accountability enhance control of corruption, which in turn exerts benign 
effects on the region`s living standards. 
                 It was manifest from the data that countries with relatively higher control of 
corruption, registered above average living standards, implying that veritable platforms to 
support voice and accountability should be invoked to attenuate the behavioral tendencies of 
perpetuating government corruption. Akin to Kock and Gaskins (2014), “Policy-makers in 
developing countries aiming at increasing voice and accountability at the national level, and 
thus the degree to which their citizens participate in the country’s governance, should strongly 
consider initiatives that broaden Internet access in their countries.” 
                 The study findings make a telling case that strengthening accountability is an 
overarching institutional capacity development strategy. Any plausible accountability 
mechanism should serve to increase transparency; broaden access to information and awareness; 
establish legitimate and pro-poor “rules of the game;” plus strengthen voice and ability to 
articulate; while improving access of poor to recourse and arbitration. Besides, disclosure of 
budget allocations to local service providers should be made mandatory, which in turn “permits 
local people at a minimum to question the use of the funds, and overtime influence the 
effectiveness in using such resources” (see the UNDP Capacity Development Resource, 
November 2006). Perhaps in concurrence with Andersen et al (2010), the internet can raise 
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information levels and in consequence detection risks. So “by enabling e-government, it 
obviates bureaucrats` role in the provision of public services and increases transparency.” The 
latter accentuates the role of internet penetration in not only increasing voice and accountability, 
but also in making the citizens cognizant of government budgetary activities. In part, it is the 
citizens` awareness of proceedings, which perhaps invariably infuses the realization into the 
accounting officers’ minds, not to indulge in (grand and petty) malpractices. 
                  Precisely stated, Andersen et al (2010) explain that “the internet facilitates the 
dissemination of information about corrupt behavior, making it more risky for bureaucrats and 
politicians to take bribes.” Besides, studies such as Jha and Sarangi (2010) plus Andersen et al 
(2010) have empirically affirmed that internet diffusion reduces corruption; and perhaps akin to 
Kock and Gaskins (2013), it plausibly attenuates corruption via enhancing voice and 
accountability. By and large, in the Caribbean and Latin America, “policies improving voice 
and accountability and reducing corruption can help to reduce the incentive to take economic 
activities underground” (see Torgler et al 2010). 
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 Tables 
Table 11: Control of Corruption and Voice and Accountability on Real GDP Per Capita 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(11, 118) =   307.36             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .98646655   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07064819
     sigma_u    .60316754
                                                                              
       _cons     6.744307   .3949307    17.08   0.000     5.962236    7.526377
        lcva     .0544314   .0259632     2.10   0.038     .0030172    .1058456
        lcoc    (omitted)
        lrol    -.0103442   .0367685    -0.28   0.779    -.0831559    .0624674
         lrq    -.0148954   .0202343    -0.74   0.463    -.0549649     .025174
         lge    -.0006858   .0220553    -0.03   0.975    -.0443613    .0429896
        lpsn    -.0892247    .028551    -3.13   0.002    -.1457635   -.0326859
         lva     .0633785   .0539993     1.17   0.243    -.0435547    .1703117
       leduc     .0987864   .0403369     2.45   0.016     .0189083    .1786646
        ltra     .1591826   .0347574     4.58   0.000     .0903536    .2280117
        lgds    -.0424276   .0146937    -2.89   0.005    -.0715251   -.0133301
        lgcf     .0342073   .0391521     0.87   0.384    -.0433245    .1117392
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6352                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(10,118)          =     14.10
       overall = 0.0450                                        max =        15
       between = 0.0415                                        avg =      11.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.5444                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        12
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       140
note: lcoc omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra leduc lva lpsn lge lrq lrol lcoc lcva, fe
 
 
Table 12: Institutional Quality (IQI7) on Real GDP Per Capita (Random Effects) 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .97079158   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .09525351
     sigma_u    .54914867
                                                                              
       _cons     5.777727   .2459441    23.49   0.000     5.295685    6.259768
       inqi7     .0195577   .0087957     2.22   0.026     .0023184    .0367971
       leduc     .1249238   .0252943     4.94   0.000     .0753478    .1744997
        ltra      .156696   .0157387     9.96   0.000     .1258486    .1875433
        lgds    -.0068712   .0108115    -0.64   0.525    -.0280613     .014319
        lgcf    -.0061604   .0293541    -0.21   0.834    -.0636933    .0513725
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(5)       =    204.92
       overall = 0.1348                                        max =        15
       between = 0.1507                                        avg =      14.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.3904                         Obs per group: min =         8
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        33
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       462
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra leduc inqi7, re
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Table 13: Institutional Quality (IQI7) on Real GDP Per Capita (Fixed Effects) 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(32, 424) =   583.88             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .99182975   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .09525351
     sigma_u    1.0494985
                                                                              
       _cons     5.412873   .2148521    25.19   0.000     4.990565     5.83518
       inqi7     .0177119    .008144     2.17   0.030     .0017042    .0337195
       leduc     .0977599   .0237164     4.12   0.000     .0511436    .1443762
        ltra     .1898006    .015314    12.39   0.000     .1596998    .2199014
        lgds    -.0075733   .0100032    -0.76   0.449    -.0272354    .0120888
        lgcf    -.0156388   .0271957    -0.58   0.566    -.0690939    .0378163
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6778                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(5,424)           =     55.33
       overall = 0.1425                                        max =        15
       between = 0.1570                                        avg =      14.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.3948                         Obs per group: min =         8
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        33
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       462
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra leduc inqi7, fe
 
 
Table 14: Institutional Quality (IQI3) on Real GDP Per Capita (Fixed Effects) 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(32, 424) =   491.90             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .99160196   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .09527947
     sigma_u    1.0353305
                                                                              
       _cons     5.475423   .2129392    25.71   0.000     5.056875     5.89397
       inqi3     .0303725   .0143235     2.12   0.035     .0022185    .0585265
       leduc     .0956604   .0236546     4.04   0.000     .0491654    .1421553
        ltra     .1858896   .0152265    12.21   0.000     .1559608    .2158184
        lgds    -.0071121    .009991    -0.71   0.477    -.0267501     .012526
        lgcf    -.0171738    .027179    -0.63   0.528    -.0705961    .0362486
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6608                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(5,424)           =     55.25
       overall = 0.1310                                        max =        15
       between = 0.1448                                        avg =      14.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.3945                         Obs per group: min =         8
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        33
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       462
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra leduc inqi3, fe
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Table 15: Institutional Quality (IQI3) on Real GDP Per Capita (Random Effects) 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .96614938   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .09527947
     sigma_u     .5090239
                                                                              
       _cons     5.891626   .2427135    24.27   0.000     5.415916    6.367336
       inqi3     .0451574   .0155616     2.90   0.004     .0146572    .0756576
       leduc     .1265685   .0254511     4.97   0.000     .0766853    .1764518
        ltra     .1485442   .0157025     9.46   0.000     .1177678    .1793205
        lgds    -.0066846   .0109216    -0.61   0.541    -.0280906    .0147215
        lgcf    -.0063929   .0296659    -0.22   0.829    -.0645369    .0517512
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(5)       =    199.28
       overall = 0.1069                                        max =        15
       between = 0.1190                                        avg =      14.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.3867                         Obs per group: min =         8
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        33
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       462
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra leduc inqi3, re
 
 
 
Table 16: Control of corruption & Living Standards (Random Effects) 
 
         rho    .93690988   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07745047
     sigma_u    .29846424
                                                                              
       _cons     6.716426   .3645496    18.42   0.000     6.001922     7.43093
        lcoc     .0379439   .0155714     2.44   0.015     .0074246    .0684632
        lrol    -.0197842   .0379321    -0.52   0.602    -.0941297    .0545613
         lrq     -.005075   .0180432    -0.28   0.779    -.0404389     .030289
        ltra     .1724234   .0278143     6.20   0.000     .1179084    .2269385
        lgds    -.0287183   .0167878    -1.71   0.087    -.0616218    .0041853
        lgcf      .021878   .0431639     0.51   0.612    -.0627217    .1064778
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(6)       =     68.45
       overall = 0.0194                                        max =        15
       between = 0.0169                                        avg =      13.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4267                         Obs per group: min =         3
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        12
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       156
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra lrq lrol lcoc, re
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Table 17: Voice & Accountability and Living Standards (Random Effects) 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .97334625   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0764478
     sigma_u    .46197616
                                                                              
       _cons     6.234432   .3539508    17.61   0.000     5.540701    6.928163
        lrol     .0022015   .0278455     0.08   0.937    -.0523746    .0567776
        lpsn    -.0221687   .0202613    -1.09   0.274    -.0618802    .0175428
         lva     .1179182   .0419389     2.81   0.005     .0357194    .2001171
        ltra     .2050699   .0256673     7.99   0.000      .154763    .2553769
        lgds     -.030828   .0152265    -2.02   0.043    -.0606714   -.0009845
        lgcf      .023646   .0399452     0.59   0.554    -.0546453    .1019372
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(6)       =     94.00
       overall = 0.0268                                        max =        15
       between = 0.0081                                        avg =      11.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.4486                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       159
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra lva lpsn lrol, re
 
 
Table 18: Voice & Accountability and Living Standards (Fixed Effects) 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .98784266   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0764478
     sigma_u    .68911178
                                                                              
       _cons     6.012562   .3274656    18.36   0.000     5.365104     6.66002
        lrol     -.008225   .0272833    -0.30   0.764    -.0621689    .0457188
        lpsn    -.0262488   .0195487    -1.34   0.182       -.0649    .0124024
         lva     .1074937   .0406168     2.65   0.009     .0271871    .1878004
        ltra     .2345699   .0262781     8.93   0.000     .1826134    .2865263
        lgds     -.030135   .0145869    -2.07   0.041    -.0589759   -.0012941
        lgcf     .0109294   .0385031     0.28   0.777    -.0651981    .0870568
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7199                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(6,139)           =     19.07
       overall = 0.0280                                        max =        15
       between = 0.0092                                        avg =      11.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.4515                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        14
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       159
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra lva lpsn lrol, fe
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Table 19: Control of corruption & Living Standards (Random Effects) 
 
                                                                              
         rho     .9516756   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07527482
     sigma_u     .3340496
                                                                              
       _cons     6.786959   .3590061    18.90   0.000      6.08332    7.490598
        lcoc     .0369113    .013155     2.81   0.005     .0111279    .0626946
        lpsn    -.0497951   .0226793    -2.20   0.028    -.0942458   -.0053444
         lva     .1379546   .0390515     3.53   0.000     .0614151    .2144942
        ltra     .1478741   .0257574     5.74   0.000     .0973905    .1983576
        lgds    -.0329238   .0153916    -2.14   0.032    -.0630908   -.0027567
        lgcf     .0418966   .0430359     0.97   0.330    -.0424522    .1262454
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(6)       =     81.94
       overall = 0.0180                                        max =        15
       between = 0.0166                                        avg =      10.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.4493                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        15
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       163
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra lva lpsn lcoc, re
 
 
Table 20: Control of Corruption and Living Standards (Fixed Effects) 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .99065346   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07527482
     sigma_u    .77497034
                                                                              
       _cons     6.182527   .3320504    18.62   0.000     5.526126    6.838928
        lcoc     .0213011   .0118373     1.80   0.074     -.002099    .0447013
        lpsn    -.0558234   .0199501    -2.80   0.006     -.095261   -.0163857
         lva     .1113151   .0347673     3.20   0.002     .0425867    .1800434
        ltra     .2203403   .0263328     8.37   0.000     .1682853    .2723954
        lgds    -.0332801   .0135058    -2.46   0.015    -.0599785   -.0065816
        lgcf     .0049858   .0381832     0.13   0.896    -.0704951    .0804667
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7013                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(6,142)           =     21.63
       overall = 0.0296                                        max =        15
       between = 0.0477                                        avg =      10.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.4775                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        15
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       163
. . xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra lva lpsn lcoc, fe
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Table 21: Government Effectiveness and Living Standards (Random Effects) 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .96427389   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .08812514
     sigma_u    .45783312
                                                                              
       _cons     6.703275   .4435671    15.11   0.000     5.833899     7.57265
         lrq    -.0409594    .023466    -1.75   0.081     -.086952    .0050332
         lge     .0387634   .0180346     2.15   0.032     .0034162    .0741107
        lpsn    -.0257996   .0247143    -1.04   0.297    -.0742387    .0226395
        ltra     .1927412   .0314742     6.12   0.000     .1310528    .2544295
        lgds    -.0278699   .0189256    -1.47   0.141    -.0649634    .0092235
        lgcf    -.1356276   .0438566    -3.09   0.002    -.2215848   -.0496703
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(6)       =     72.17
       overall = 0.0485                                        max =        15
       between = 0.0559                                        avg =       9.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.4482                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        17
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       156
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra lpsn lge lrq, re
 
 
Table 22: Control of Corruption and Living Standards (Fixed Effects) 
         rho    .99107266   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07615711
     sigma_u    .80242095
                                                                              
       _cons     6.059322   .3615367    16.76   0.000      5.34374    6.774905
        lcoc     .0598113   .0272359     2.20   0.030     .0059037    .1137188
         lge    -.0252666   .0212697    -1.19   0.237    -.0673653    .0168322
        lpsn    -.0818248   .0285886    -2.86   0.005    -.1384096     -.02524
        ltra     .2333457   .0287638     8.11   0.000     .1764142    .2902772
        lgds     -.049702   .0151087    -3.29   0.001    -.0796064   -.0197975
        lgcf     .0042335   .0413409     0.10   0.919    -.0775917    .0860587
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7554                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(6,124)           =     18.63
       overall = 0.0567                                        max =        15
       between = 0.1155                                        avg =      11.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4741                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        13
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       143
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra lpsn lge lcoc, fe
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Table 23: Voice and Accountability and living standards (Random Effects) 
 
         rho    .97374343   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07282839
     sigma_u    .44351058
                                                                              
       _cons     6.362609   .3650996    17.43   0.000     5.647027    7.078191
        lrol    -.0036358   .0358727    -0.10   0.919    -.0739451    .0666735
         lge     .0117105   .0159274     0.74   0.462    -.0195067    .0429277
        lpsn    -.0502779    .026345    -1.91   0.056    -.1019131    .0013573
         lva     .1524491   .0462732     3.29   0.001     .0617553     .243143
        ltra     .1958783   .0272577     7.19   0.000     .1424542    .2493025
        lgds    -.0385245   .0158203    -2.44   0.015    -.0695317   -.0075173
        lgcf     .0251195   .0413811     0.61   0.544     -.055986     .106225
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =     98.54
       overall = 0.0459                                        max =        15
       between = 0.0063                                        avg =      10.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.4993                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       142
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra lva lpsn lge lrol, re
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Table 24: Voice & Accountability and living standards (Fixed Effects) 
 
         rho    .98895024   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07282839
     sigma_u    .68898789
                                                                              
       _cons     6.128672   .3451658    17.76   0.000     5.445325    6.812019
        lrol    -.0180584   .0361384    -0.50   0.618    -.0896039     .053487
         lge     .0086422   .0151265     0.57   0.569    -.0213046    .0385891
        lpsn    -.0553354    .025218    -2.19   0.030     -.105261   -.0054098
         lva     .1449173   .0441584     3.28   0.001     .0574941    .2323405
        ltra     .2259408   .0278192     8.12   0.000     .1708653    .2810163
        lgds    -.0376362   .0150335    -2.50   0.014    -.0673991   -.0078734
        lgcf     .0121145     .03942     0.31   0.759    -.0659278    .0901568
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7390                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,121)           =     17.53
       overall = 0.0494                                        max =        15
       between = 0.0097                                        avg =      10.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.5035                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        14
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       142
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra lva lpsn lge lrol, fe
 
 
 
 
 
Table 25: Control of corruption and living standards (Random Effects) 
 
         rho    .96513891   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07272761
     sigma_u    .38266942
                                                                              
       _cons     6.761324   .3674195    18.40   0.000     6.041195    7.481453
        lcoc     .0779991   .0279082     2.79   0.005     .0232999    .1326982
         lge    -.0358896   .0222186    -1.62   0.106    -.0794372     .007658
        lpsn    -.1016412   .0299048    -3.40   0.001    -.1602536   -.0430289
         lva     .1624683    .043304     3.75   0.000      .077594    .2473426
        ltra     .1559809   .0266318     5.86   0.000     .1037836    .2081782
        lgds      -.04674   .0158378    -2.95   0.003    -.0777815   -.0156985
        lgcf     .0540464   .0432175     1.25   0.211    -.0306584    .1387512
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =     96.17
       overall = 0.0578                                        max =        15
       between = 0.0949                                        avg =      11.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.5065                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        13
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       143
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra lva lpsn lge lcoc, re
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Table 26: Control of corruption and living standards (Fixed Effects) 
 
         rho    .99094577   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07272761
     sigma_u     .7608489
                                                                              
       _cons     6.174526   .3467347    17.81   0.000     5.488186    6.860867
        lcoc     .0540062   .0260593     2.07   0.040     .0024233    .1055891
         lge    -.0305307   .0203644    -1.50   0.136    -.0708408    .0097795
        lpsn    -.0937545   .0275014    -3.41   0.001    -.1481918   -.0393172
         lva     .1440857    .040008     3.60   0.000     .0648923     .223279
        ltra       .21813   .0277915     7.85   0.000     .1631184    .2731415
        lgds    -.0467469   .0144517    -3.23   0.002    -.0753532   -.0181407
        lgcf     .0260919   .0399431     0.65   0.515     -.052973    .1051567
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7450                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,123)           =     19.36
       overall = 0.0624                                        max =        15
       between = 0.1150                                        avg =      11.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.5242                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        13
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       143
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra lva lpsn lge lcoc, fe
 
 
 
 
Table 27: Control of corruption and living standards (Random Effects) 
 
         rho    .97195936   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07644888
     sigma_u    .45009193
                                                                              
       _cons     6.701275   .4050172    16.55   0.000     5.907456    7.495094
        lcoc     .0861984    .028716     3.00   0.003      .029916    .1424808
         lrq    -.0224147    .021483    -1.04   0.297    -.0645206    .0196912
         lge    -.0212754   .0241985    -0.88   0.379    -.0687036    .0261529
        lpsn    -.0939859   .0309958    -3.03   0.002    -.1547365   -.0332352
        ltra     .1667161   .0294909     5.65   0.000     .1089149    .2245173
        lgds    -.0492828   .0162249    -3.04   0.002    -.0810831   -.0174825
        lgcf     .0262295   .0439671     0.60   0.551    -.0599444    .1124034
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =     82.21
       overall = 0.0495                                        max =        15
       between = 0.1008                                        avg =      11.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4590                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        13
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       143
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra lpsn lge lrq lcoc, re
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Table 28: Control of corruption and living standards (Fixed effects) 
 
  more  
         rho    .99087771   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07644888
     sigma_u    .79676297
                                                                              
       _cons     6.092602    .389537    15.64   0.000     5.321537    6.863666
        lcoc     .0606633   .0275793     2.20   0.030     .0060718    .1152549
         lrq    -.0048198   .0204955    -0.24   0.814    -.0453893    .0357498
         lge    -.0234794   .0226634    -1.04   0.302    -.0683402    .0213814
        lpsn    -.0831846   .0292749    -2.84   0.005    -.1411324   -.0252368
        ltra      .230513   .0312858     7.37   0.000     .1685847    .2924414
        lgds    -.0495107   .0151884    -3.26   0.001    -.0795753   -.0194462
        lgcf     .0041552   .0415006     0.10   0.920    -.0779927    .0863031
                                                                              
        lipc        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7519                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,123)           =     15.85
       overall = 0.0565                                        max =        15
       between = 0.1152                                        avg =      11.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4743                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country1                        Number of groups   =        13
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       143
. xtreg lipc lgcf lgds ltra lpsn lge lrq lcoc, fe
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